Non-physical causation may simply be an artifact of the dualist theory 2. In fact, this sort of causation is more basic than the manifestation of a disposition c.
In contrast to Plato's claim that the soul can exist apart from the body, Aristotle argued De Anima Bk. Just as the form of an axe is whatever enables it to cut, and the form of an eye is whatever enables it to see, the human soul is to be identified with whichever powers and capacities enable a natural, organized human body to fulfill its defining function, which, according to Aristotle, is to survive and flourish as a living, acting, perceiving, and reasoning being.
So, Aristotle argues, the soul is inseparable from the body, and comprises whichever capacities are required for a body to live, perceive, reason, and act.
See Shields,and Nelson,for further debate about whether Aristotle's view can be considered to be a version of functionalism. A second, relatively early, ancestor of contemporary functionalism is Hobbes's account of reasoning as a kind of computation that proceeds by mechanistic principles comparable to the rules of arithmetic.
It was not until the middle of the 20th century, however, that it became common to speculate that thinking may be nothing more than rule-governed computation that can be carried out by creatures of various physical types.
As an empirical psychological theory, behaviorism holds that the behavior of humans and other animals can be explained by appealing solely to behavioral dispositions, that is, to the lawlike tendencies of organisms to behave in certain ways, given certain environmental stimulations.
Behavioral dispositions, unlike thoughts, feelings, and other internal states that can be directly observed only by introspection, are objectively observable and are indisputably part of the natural world. Thus they seemed to be fit entities to figure centrally in the emerging science of psychology.
Behaviorism indeed had some early successes, especially in the domain of animal learning, and its principles are still used, at least for heuristic purposes, in various areas of psychology.
But as many psychologists and others, e. Chomsky have argued, the successes of behaviorism seem to depend upon the experimenters' implicit control of certain variables which, when made explicit, involve ineliminable reference to organisms' other mental states.
For example, rats are typically placed into an experimental situation at a certain fraction of their normal body weight — and thus can be assumed to feel hunger and to want the food rewards contingent upon behaving in certain ways.
Similarly, it is assumed that humans, in analogous experimental situations, want to cooperate with the experimenters, and understand and know how to follow the instructions.
It seemed to the critics of behaviorism, therefore, that theories that explicitly appeal to an organism's beliefs, desires, and other mental states, as well as to stimulations and behavior, would provide a fuller and more accurate account of why organisms behave as they do.
They could do so, moreover, without compromising the objectivity of psychology as long as the mental states to which these theories appeal are introduced as states that together play a role in the production of behavior, rather than states identifiable solely by introspection.
Logical behaviorism, in contrast to behaviorism as a psychological theory, is a thesis about the meanings of our mental state terms or concepts. According to logical behaviorism, all statements about mental states and processes are equivalent in meaning to statements about behavioral dispositions.
In addition, logical behaviorists argued that if statements about mental states were equivalent in meaning to statements about behavioral dispositions, there could be an unproblematic account of how mental state terms could be applied both to oneself and others, and how they could be taught and learned.
However, as many philosophers have pointed out Chisholm ; Geachlogical behaviorism provides an implausible account of the meanings of our mental state terms, since, intuitively, a subject can have the mental states in question without the relevant behavioral dispositions — and vice versa.
For example, Gene may believe that it's going to rain even if he's not disposed to wear a raincoat and take an umbrella when leaving the house or to perform any other cluster of rain-avoiding behaviorsif Gene doesn't mind, or actively enjoys, getting wet.
And subjects with the requisite motivation can suppress their tendencies to pain behavior even in the presence of excruciating pain, while skilled actors can perfect the lawlike disposition to produce pain behavior under certain conditions, even if they don't actually feel pain.
Putnam The problem, these philosophers argued, is that no mental state, by itself, can be plausibly assumed to give rise to any particular behavior unless one also assumes that the subject possesses additional mental states of various types. And so, it seemed, it was not in fact possible to give meaning-preserving translations of statements invoking pains, beliefs, and desires in purely behavioristic terms.
It's important to recognize, however, that there is at least some overlap in the bloodlines of these different strains of functionalism, and also that there are functionalist theories, both earlier and more recent, that fall somewhere in between.
Still, it is instructive to give separate treatment to the three major strains of the doctrine, as long as these caveats are kept in mind. If the machine is in state Si, and receives input Ij, it will go into state Sk and produce output Ol for a finite number of states, inputs and outputs.
A machine table of this sort describes the operation of a deterministic automaton, but most machine state functionalists e. Putnam take the proper model for the mind to be that of a probabilistic automaton: These states are not mere behavioral dispositions, since they are specified in terms of their relations not only to inputs and outputs, but also to the state of the machine at the time.
For example, if believing it will rain is regarded as a machine state, it will not be regarded as a disposition to take one's umbrella after looking at the weather report, but rather as a disposition to take one's umbrella if one looks at the weather report and is in the state of wanting to stay dry.
So machine state functionalism can avoid what many have thought to be a fatal difficulty for behaviorism. In addition, machines of this sort provide at least a simple model of how internal states whose effects on output occur by means of mechanical processes can be viewed as representations though the question of what, exactly, they represent has been an ongoing topic of discussion see sections 4.
Finally, machine table states are not tied to any particular physical or other realization; the same program, after all, can be run on different sorts of computer hardware. It's easy to see, therefore, why Turing machines provided a fruitful model for early functionalist theories.
However, because machine table states are total states of a system, the early functionalist equation of mental states with machine table states faded in importance as a model for the functional characterization of the complex of distinct internal states that can be simultaneously realized in a human or other subject Block and Fodor ; Putnam Nonetheless, the idea that internal states can be fully described in terms of their relations to input, output, and one another, and can figure in lawlike descriptions, and predictions, of a system's output, was a rich and important idea that is retained by contemporary functionalist theories.
And many functionalists e. Rey argue that mental states are best regarded as computational states but see Piccinini for dissent and the entry The Computational Theory of Mind for a comprehensive discussion of this question.
In contrast to the behaviorists' insistence that the laws of psychology appeal only to behavioral dispositions, cognitive psychologists argue that the best empirical theories of behavior take it to be the result of a complex of mental states and processes, introduced and individuated in terms of the roles they play in producing the behavior to be explained.the idea of a relation, which is what functionalism wants: a mental state is conscious just as a matter of its relations to other mental states and behaviour.
For functionalism to succeed, consciousness must be completely reducible . popular version of functionalism, ‘causal role functionalism’, the idea is understood causally. A mental state is a causal disposition to act in certain ways, and to have certain consider functionalism a form of property dualism.) functionalist theories of consciousness.
If we think about sensations, e.g. pain, being. Most arguments in favour of dualism attempt to show that the mind has some property which the body or brain does not and could not have, and so the two have to be different.
Space: Thoughts exist in a non-spatial world of ideas, but the body exists in space (p) MODERN A Science: the dualist theory of mind seems the only thing. This entry concerns dualism in the philosophy of mind.
The term ‘dualism’ has a variety of uses in the history of thought. In general, the idea is that, for some particular domain, there are two fundamental kinds or categories of things or principles. Functionalism, Conflict, and Interactionism in Education Victoria Aronne SOC Introduction to Sociology Instructor: Emily Frydrych March 30, Functionalism, Conflict, and Interactionism in Education The three theories I plan to discuss are Functionalism, .
theory to zoology. In contemporary philosophy of mind, however, it is uniformly understood to the public world of causes and effects studied by science.
They are ‘inner’ only in the sense that In this sense functionalism is compatible with dualism (see Dualism). However, most.